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Peer Reviewed Articles
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[4] Strategic Promotion, Reputation, and Responsiveness in Bureaucratic Hierarchies
with Xinyu Fan. Journal of Theoretical Politics, 2019, 31(3): 286-307.
While existing studies usually model promotion as a bilateral interaction between promoter and promotee, it is not uncommon that the promoter is under the influence of a third-party. For instance, authoritarian rulers may consider how their interactions with local agents change the way that citizens view them. Similarly, a mid-tier officer in a bureaucratic hierarchy often concerns herself with her image in the eyes of her superior when managing her subordinates. In this paper, we construct a game-theoretic model to investigate promotion strategies when promoters have reputation concerns. We show that promoters can use promotion as a signaling tool, where she can deliberately postpone promoting the subordinate to enhance her own reputation. Furthermore, the promoter has extra incentives to shirk, knowing that she can manipulate promotion in the future. Thus, strategic promotions decrease government responsiveness. Counter-intuitively, such decrease is more severe when intra-bureaucracy information is more transparent. In other words, transparency may do more harm than good. We conduct a case study of the Chinese bureaucracy and provide supportive evidence. [Post-print, Pre-print (SSRN)]
[3] Organizational Structure, Policy Learning, and Economic Performance: Evidence from the Chinese Commune
with Joshua Eisenman. Socius, 2018, doi:10.1177/2378023118757650.
Using original county-level panel data on Chinese communes over two decades, 1958 to 1979, this article builds upon existing theories about the influence of organizational size and structure on institutional performance. We found a consistent and robust interaction effect among the size of the commune (i.e., the coordination level) and its subunits, the brigade (i.e., the supervisory level) and production teams (i.e., the working level), on agricultural productivity. Future work on the relationship between organizational performance and size would likely benefit from including such interaction variables. We also provide evidence that to create a more productive institution, county-level officials learned from their most productive neighbors and adjusted the size of their communes accordingly. This work explains the role of organizational structure as a driver of economic performance and how policy diffusion occurred during China’s Maoist era—a period generally treated as a monolith rather than a period of institutional change. [Free Access]
Pre-PhD:
[2] Overseas Students, Returnees and the Diffusion of International Norms into Post-Mao China
with David Zweig. International Studies Review, 2014, 16(2): 252-63.
This paper applies the model of diffusion outlined by Solingen (International Studies Quarterly, 56, 2012, 631) to the case of Chinese who studied abroad after 1978. It assesses the ability of those who have not returned to pressure the state to introduce Western academic, scientific, and business norms. It looks at the role of the returnees and national leaders in introducing these norms, particularly as a means to create world-class universities, scientific research centers, and modern private firms. It demonstrates the power of firewalls (including institutional leaders, the Chinese marketplace, and administrators who lose under reform) to block the diffusionary process. [Link]
[1] Authoritarian Orientations and Political Trust in East Asian Societies
with Deyong Ma. East Asia, 2014, 34(4): 323-41.
Existing studies have proposed two sets of determinants of political trust: institutional theory argues that political trust is generated from high-quality political institutions while cultural theory states that political trust is rooted in historical-cultural factors such as social trust. Using survey data from 13 East Asian societies, this article investigates the determinants of political trust with emphasis on a particular cultural element: authoritarian orientations. We find a strong positive correlation between authoritarian orientations and political trust in this region. The finding appears robust to a battery of sensitivity checks, including alternative measures of authoritarian orientations using the obedience to parents or teachers. [Link]
with Xinyu Fan. Journal of Theoretical Politics, 2019, 31(3): 286-307.
While existing studies usually model promotion as a bilateral interaction between promoter and promotee, it is not uncommon that the promoter is under the influence of a third-party. For instance, authoritarian rulers may consider how their interactions with local agents change the way that citizens view them. Similarly, a mid-tier officer in a bureaucratic hierarchy often concerns herself with her image in the eyes of her superior when managing her subordinates. In this paper, we construct a game-theoretic model to investigate promotion strategies when promoters have reputation concerns. We show that promoters can use promotion as a signaling tool, where she can deliberately postpone promoting the subordinate to enhance her own reputation. Furthermore, the promoter has extra incentives to shirk, knowing that she can manipulate promotion in the future. Thus, strategic promotions decrease government responsiveness. Counter-intuitively, such decrease is more severe when intra-bureaucracy information is more transparent. In other words, transparency may do more harm than good. We conduct a case study of the Chinese bureaucracy and provide supportive evidence. [Post-print, Pre-print (SSRN)]
[3] Organizational Structure, Policy Learning, and Economic Performance: Evidence from the Chinese Commune
with Joshua Eisenman. Socius, 2018, doi:10.1177/2378023118757650.
Using original county-level panel data on Chinese communes over two decades, 1958 to 1979, this article builds upon existing theories about the influence of organizational size and structure on institutional performance. We found a consistent and robust interaction effect among the size of the commune (i.e., the coordination level) and its subunits, the brigade (i.e., the supervisory level) and production teams (i.e., the working level), on agricultural productivity. Future work on the relationship between organizational performance and size would likely benefit from including such interaction variables. We also provide evidence that to create a more productive institution, county-level officials learned from their most productive neighbors and adjusted the size of their communes accordingly. This work explains the role of organizational structure as a driver of economic performance and how policy diffusion occurred during China’s Maoist era—a period generally treated as a monolith rather than a period of institutional change. [Free Access]
Pre-PhD:
[2] Overseas Students, Returnees and the Diffusion of International Norms into Post-Mao China
with David Zweig. International Studies Review, 2014, 16(2): 252-63.
This paper applies the model of diffusion outlined by Solingen (International Studies Quarterly, 56, 2012, 631) to the case of Chinese who studied abroad after 1978. It assesses the ability of those who have not returned to pressure the state to introduce Western academic, scientific, and business norms. It looks at the role of the returnees and national leaders in introducing these norms, particularly as a means to create world-class universities, scientific research centers, and modern private firms. It demonstrates the power of firewalls (including institutional leaders, the Chinese marketplace, and administrators who lose under reform) to block the diffusionary process. [Link]
[1] Authoritarian Orientations and Political Trust in East Asian Societies
with Deyong Ma. East Asia, 2014, 34(4): 323-41.
Existing studies have proposed two sets of determinants of political trust: institutional theory argues that political trust is generated from high-quality political institutions while cultural theory states that political trust is rooted in historical-cultural factors such as social trust. Using survey data from 13 East Asian societies, this article investigates the determinants of political trust with emphasis on a particular cultural element: authoritarian orientations. We find a strong positive correlation between authoritarian orientations and political trust in this region. The finding appears robust to a battery of sensitivity checks, including alternative measures of authoritarian orientations using the obedience to parents or teachers. [Link]
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Working Papers
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[5] Modeling and Estimating Unpredictability with Applications in Political Economy
[4] Learn from the Visible: Return to Political Offices and Political Strategies of Business Elites
Presented at the 2018 APSA annual conference, Boston, USA, Sept. 2018.
[3] Political Incorporation, Exchanges, and Government Subsidies
Presented at 15th Graduate Seminar on China, The Chinese University of Hong Kong, Jan. 2019.
[2] The Rise of the Super Rich and Authoritarian Survival: Theory and Evidence
[1] Officials’ Rotation, Bureaucratic Control and Corruption in an Authoritarian State
Presented at the 2015 APSA annual conference, San Francisco, USA, Sept. 2015.
[4] Learn from the Visible: Return to Political Offices and Political Strategies of Business Elites
Presented at the 2018 APSA annual conference, Boston, USA, Sept. 2018.
[3] Political Incorporation, Exchanges, and Government Subsidies
Presented at 15th Graduate Seminar on China, The Chinese University of Hong Kong, Jan. 2019.
[2] The Rise of the Super Rich and Authoritarian Survival: Theory and Evidence
[1] Officials’ Rotation, Bureaucratic Control and Corruption in an Authoritarian State
Presented at the 2015 APSA annual conference, San Francisco, USA, Sept. 2015.
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Work in Progress
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[3] Political Incorporation, (In)Formal Institutions, and State-Business Exchanges: Theory and Evidence
[2] Elites, Networks, and Reform (with Ting Chen)
[1] Taming Local Agents in a Non-democratic State: Experimental Evidence from China (with Chao-yo Cheng and Tao Lin)
[2] Elites, Networks, and Reform (with Ting Chen)
[1] Taming Local Agents in a Non-democratic State: Experimental Evidence from China (with Chao-yo Cheng and Tao Lin)