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Working papers (available upon request)
Bureaucratic Control, Information Management, and Government Responsiveness (with Xinyu Fan) [PDF]
[Previously entitled “Strategic Promotions and Reputation Building in Hierarchies: Theory and Evidence”]
The Rise of the Superrich and Authoritarian Survival: Theory and Cross-national Evidence
Officials' Rotation, Bureaucratic Control, and Corruption: Evidence from Chinese Firms
[Recently discussed on the Transparency International’s Anti-Corruption Research Network]
Career Expectation and Public Goods Provision: Evidence from Chinese Municipal Mayors (with Yongshun Cai)
Work in progress
Economic Decentralization, Political Incorporation, and Taxation: Theory and Evidence
Peer-reviewed journal articles
"Organizational Structure, Policy Learning, and Economic Performance: Evidence from the Chinese Commune," (with Joshua Eisenman). Socius. 2018. 4: 1–18.
[Socius is the open-access journal of the American Sociological Association (ASA).]
Abstract: Using original county-level panel data on Chinese communes over two decades, 1958 to 1979, this article builds upon existing theories about the influence of organizational size and structure on institutional performance. We found a consistent and robust interaction effect among the size of the commune (i.e., the coordination level) and its subunits, the brigade (i.e., the supervisory level) and production teams (i.e., the working level), on agricultural productivity. Future work on the relationship between organizational performance and size would likely benefit from including such interaction variables. We also provide evidence that to create a more productive institution, county-level officials learned from their most productive neighbors and adjusted the size of their communes accordingly. This work explains the role of organizational structure as a driver of economic performance and how policy diffusion occurred during China’s Maoist era—a period generally treated as a monolith rather than a period of institutional change.
"Authoritarian Orientations and Political Trust in East Asian Societies," (with Deyong Ma), East Asia, 2014, 34(4): 323-41.
"Overseas Students, Returnees and the Diffusion of International Norms into Post-Mao China," (with David Zweig), International Studies Review, 2014, 16(2): 252-63.
Working papers (available upon request)
Bureaucratic Control, Information Management, and Government Responsiveness (with Xinyu Fan) [PDF]
[Previously entitled “Strategic Promotions and Reputation Building in Hierarchies: Theory and Evidence”]
The Rise of the Superrich and Authoritarian Survival: Theory and Cross-national Evidence
Officials' Rotation, Bureaucratic Control, and Corruption: Evidence from Chinese Firms
[Recently discussed on the Transparency International’s Anti-Corruption Research Network]
Career Expectation and Public Goods Provision: Evidence from Chinese Municipal Mayors (with Yongshun Cai)
Work in progress
Economic Decentralization, Political Incorporation, and Taxation: Theory and Evidence
Peer-reviewed journal articles
"Organizational Structure, Policy Learning, and Economic Performance: Evidence from the Chinese Commune," (with Joshua Eisenman). Socius. 2018. 4: 1–18.
[Socius is the open-access journal of the American Sociological Association (ASA).]
Abstract: Using original county-level panel data on Chinese communes over two decades, 1958 to 1979, this article builds upon existing theories about the influence of organizational size and structure on institutional performance. We found a consistent and robust interaction effect among the size of the commune (i.e., the coordination level) and its subunits, the brigade (i.e., the supervisory level) and production teams (i.e., the working level), on agricultural productivity. Future work on the relationship between organizational performance and size would likely benefit from including such interaction variables. We also provide evidence that to create a more productive institution, county-level officials learned from their most productive neighbors and adjusted the size of their communes accordingly. This work explains the role of organizational structure as a driver of economic performance and how policy diffusion occurred during China’s Maoist era—a period generally treated as a monolith rather than a period of institutional change.
"Authoritarian Orientations and Political Trust in East Asian Societies," (with Deyong Ma), East Asia, 2014, 34(4): 323-41.
"Overseas Students, Returnees and the Diffusion of International Norms into Post-Mao China," (with David Zweig), International Studies Review, 2014, 16(2): 252-63.